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Introduction
Do private firms allow third-parties to access their platform or develop extensions for their product when it is socially desirable? This question has repeatedly been a concern for anti-trust authorities. For example, in 1955 the FCC in the United States agreed with the AT&T Bell System that an attachment to phones (the Hush-A-Phone) that helped to reduce noise could not be marketed and sold independently since it was a "foreign attachment"
to the AT&T network. The FCC also concluded that all telephone equipment should be sold by the network operator. This decision was however overturned on appeal by the D.C. Circuit. 1 In line with this appeal, the FCC later (in 1968) ruled that another attachment marketed by an independent firm, the Carterfone, should be able to be used on the AT&T Bell System network.
Another example is the anti-trust case Eastern Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc 2 . Kodak had excluded third-parties from being able to service the equipment they had sold. The Supreme Court, however, ruled that external firms should be able to service Kodak's equipment.
In contrast to previous literature on this question, I take a two-sided market approach and propose two new reasons for why private incentives may be insufficient. First, a private firm may not be able to internalize all benefits from cross-group externalities arising when third-parties are involved. Second, firms may have strategic incentives to shut out producers of third-party extensions because closed platforms relaxe competition for consumers.
My arguments are based on the recent literature on two-sided markets. 3 In two-sided markets, platforms intermediate transactions between two groups of agents. The groups impose externalities on each other, and platforms should set price to each group so as to best internalize these externalities. If we assume the groups are consumers and third-party producers of extensions to the platform, we can analyze if platforms' incentives to deal with both groups instead of just one are socially efficient.
1 Hush-A-Phone Corp., 20 .F.C.C. 391, 420 (1955) (Decision), rev'd, 238 F2.d 266 (D.C. Cir. 1956) 2 Eastern Kodak Co. v. Image Tech Services, 125 F3d. 1995 Ninth Circuit, 1997 3 Seminal papers include Rochet and Tirole (2003) , Caillaud and Jullien (2003) , Rochet and Tirole (2006) , Hagiu (2006) and Armstrong (2006) . I start out in section 2 by setting up and discussing a simple monopoly model. I show that social incentives to allow third parties access to the platform are likely stronger than private incentives. I then introduce competition between platforms in section 3 to show that platforms may inefficiently choose to commit to excluding third-parties because it relaxes competition for consumers.
The literature on vertical relations in complementary markets is closely related to this paper. 4 The central "Chicago School" argument -see for example Bowman (1957) and Bork (1978) -says that private and social incentives for vertical integration in complementary markets should coincide.
The reason is that a platform should have no incentives to vertically integrate into the supply of a complementary good unless it is efficient, since it can always raise the price of the platform to internalize any potential surplus from the sale of the complementary good.
But the basic "Chicago School" argument can break down for several reasons. For example, as Choi and Stefanadis (2001) show, integration may protect against entry by competitors, and as Whinston (1990) shows, that if the if the downstream product has other uses, integration might be used to leverage monopoly power into the other market.
Since I depart from the two-sided market literature, I use several assumptions commonly not used in this literature. First, I place heavy emphasis on the existence of cross-group externalities between consumers and thirdparty extension providers. All else equal, increased participation by one group lead to more participation by the other. Second, firms in my model set a fee that third-partiy producers must pay for the right to develop an extension. This fee can also be negative, in which case it is a subsidy intended to encourage participation by third-parties. Third, I consider several atomistic third-party extension providers that do not compete with each other and take the fee set by the firm as given. Further, the pricing decision of third-party extension providers is completely "blackboxed" and they are simply assumed to profit from interacting with consumers. The drawback 4 The literature is vast and includes for example analyses of tying complementary products (E.g. Whinston (1990) , Carlton and Waldman (2002) , Choi and Stefanadis (2001) and Nalebuff (2004) ), innovation and integration in systems markets (e.g. Farrell and Katz (2000) ), systems versus component competition (e.g. Matutes and Regibeau (1988) , Economides (1989) , Farrell et al. (1998) , non-price discrimination (e.g. Economides (1998)), and intersystem competition and vertical foreclosure (e.g. Church and Gandal (2000) ).
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Consumers Consumers They are heterogeneous in terms of coming up with a business idea, setting up shop, and providing an extension. These costs are scaled by f . Each extension provider is able to extract an expected profit of a > 0 from each consumer purchasing the platform.
Extension provider j has total profits
it represents a fee that must be paid for the right to develop an extension.
If s is negative it is a subsidy intended to encourage the development of extensions. Development costs are sufficiently large so in equilibrium some developers always choose to remain inactive. 6 Finally, the total number of consumers purchasing the platform is n c .
Optimal Price and Fee/Subsidy
When the platform is closed demand for the platform and the location of the consumer indifferent between buying the platform and not buying the
. The firm sets price to maximize
Optimal price is p * C = 1 2 v and profits are π This gives n c = 1 f t−ab (f (v − p) − bs) and n e = 1 f t−ab (a(v − p) − st). The firm sets price to consumers and the fee (subsidy) to extension providers to maximize
Optimal prices are
The profit, consumer surplus, and total extension provider profit at these prices are
and
The second order conditions are − 2f f t−ab < 0 and
2 ) > 0. I assume that 4f t − (a + b) 2 > 0 to ensure that these hold. This says that the cross-group externalities are sufficiently small in relation to the transportation costs and the costs for developing extensions. At optimum, the price and the fee (subsidy) depends on the size of the cross-group externalities. The firm balances the price and the fee (subsidy) to best internalize externalities. Extension providers are subsidized if b > a. Profits are increasing in cross-group externalities and in the intrinsic quality of the platform.
Because it becomes harder to attract consumers and extension providers, profits are decreasing in consumer transportation costs and in the costs for developing extensions.
Private versus Social Incentives
We can now compare private and social incentives to allow third parties to access the platform and develop extensions for it. A private firm will provide 6 an open platform if π * O − π * C − F > 0. In comparison, the socially optimal choice is to provide an open platform if
The difference between these two equations,
is positive for a, b > 0 and 4f t − (a + b) 2 > 0. The reason private incentives differ from social incentives is that some of the benefits from cross-group externalities goes to consumers and some to extension providers. 
firms. Extension providers must pay the fixed development cost twice if they wish to supply an extension for both platforms. Conditional on the number of consumers at each platform, an extension provider j has profits π jk = an ck − f y j − s k from each platform k ∈ {1, 2}. The costs of developing extensions are high enough to ensure that some developers always stay out of the market. 9
Stage 2: Equilibrium Prices and Fees/Subsidies
If both platforms are closed the model reduces to the standard Hotelling model. For the consumer indifferent between purchasing the platform from
and demand for firm 2's platform is n c2 = 1 − n c1 . The firms simultaneously set price to consumers to maximize
This results in equilibrium prices of p * k = t, and profits of π * kCC = t 2 . The second order conditions, − f (an ck − s k ). To obtain demands as functions of prices on both sides of the market we simultaneously solve the equations n c1 = n cond c1 , n c2 = n cond c2 , n e1 = n cond e1 and n e2 = n cond e2 . This gives
, and (11)
The firms simultaneously set prices, p k , to consumers and the fees(subsidies)
to extension providers, s k , to maximize
Equilibrium prices are p * k = t − 1 4f (a(a + 3b)) and s * k = 1 4 (a − b). Profits, consumer surplus and total extension provider profits at these prices are
The second order conditions, - Conditional on the number of extensions available at platform 1, the consumer indifferent between the platforms is located at x in with x in satisfying
tional on the number of extension providers that develop for platform 1 is
and demand for platform 2 is n cond c2 = 1 − n cond c1 . The developer indifferent between developing for platform 1 and not developing is located at y 1 = 1 f (an c1 − s 1 ). Demand for developing extensions for platform 1 conditional on the number of consumers purchasing platform 1 is then n cond e1 = 1 f (an c1 − s 1 ). To obtain demands as functions of prices on both sides of the market, I simultaneously solve the equations n c1 = n cond c1 , n c2 = n cond c2 and n e1 = n cond e1 . This gives
Firm 1 sets price to consumers and the fee (or subsidy) to extension providers to maximize
Firm 2 simultaneously sets price to consumers to maximize
Equilibrium prices are
Platform profits, consumer surplus and extension provider profits are
The second order conditions2f 2f t−ab < 0, − 4t 2f t−ab < 0 and
(ab−2f t) 2 > 0 are satisfied for 4f t − (a + b) 2 > 0. By reversing the identities of the platforms, we can get profits under the outcome Closed-Open. These profits are π * 1CO = π * 2OC and π * 2CO = π * 1OC . Application developers are subsidized if b > a. The size of cross-group externalities and the costs of developing applications can either increase or decrease profits. The reason is that while cross-group externalities benefit the platform, they also lead to intensified competition for consumers (more on this below).
Figure 3: The simultaneous game played by private firms before they set prices and fees. 
The first condition always holds since the difference between the left and right side is 
10 The difference between the left and right side can be simplified to 4(17a
, which holds for sufficiently large f t.
13
The first two and the second two conditions are equivalent. The first two conditions hold for 2a 2 b 2 + (a 2 − 6ab + b 2 )f t > 0, which is positive for large f t only if a 2 − 6ab + b 2 > 0 or equivalently if (a − b) 2 − 4ab > 0. Hence, for large f t and sufficiently small difference in cross group externalities, so that (a − b) 2 − 4ab < 0, firms will not have incentives to provide open platforms even if it would be socially desirable. The reason is that opening the platform makes the rival more aggressive in pricing.
Proposition 2. There exist cases in which competing platforms exclude third-party providers in a sub-game perfect equilibrium. This exclusion is socially inefficient both because third-party providers are excluded and because it relaxes competition for consumers.
To see that competition is intensified, consider the best response functions of the firms. The best response functions for price for firm 1 when its platform is closed are p 1 (p 2 ) CC = , and p 1 (s 1 , p 2 , s 2 ) OO = 
Conclusions
Do private firms allow third-parties to access their platform and develop extensions for their product when it is socially desirable to do so? In this paper I proposed two reasons for why this may not be true. First, a private firm may not be able to internalize all benefits from cross-group externalities arising with third-party extensions. Second, firms may have strategic incentives to shut out producers of third-party extensions as a device to relax competition for consumers.
My analysis suggests that private incentives to allow third-parties access to platforms may be insufficient. It hence supports the argument that policy should be directed towards supporting open platforms that allow third-parties to access the platform and develop extensions for it.
